Monetary Policy in 1974 and Beyond by James Tobin
JAMES  TOBIN 
Yale University 
Monetary  Policy  in 
1974  and  Beyond 
WHAT  SHOULD BE THE AIM of monetary policy in 1974? One answer is the 
fulfillment of the administration's forecast for the year. As explained in 
the President's  Economic  Report,  the forecast is also the target; according to 
the Council of Economic Advisers, it is the best feasible path for the econ- 
omy. I personally do not agree with this policy, nor do I believe it carries 
out the mandate of the Employment Act of 1946. But accepting it, one can 
ask what kind of monetary policy is likely to fulfill the forecast. 
The expected and approved path appears to be quarter-to-quarter  rates 
of growth of real gross national product in 1974 of roughly -0.5,  0, 1, and 
1 percent, with unemployment rising to about 5.6 percent in the second 
quarter and remaining there the rest of the year. The rate of price inflation 
would fall sharply in the second quarter, but rise slightly toward the end 
of the year. 
The target forecast of January  does not differ radically from more recent 
forecasts made by  private economists.  Table  1 reports George  Perry's 
latest guesses. (A difference of semantic and political significance, but  of 
no economic import, is that Perry's trajectory qualifies as a "recession.") 
What monetary policy will achieve this outcome in 1974? The council 
suggests a year-over-year  increase of 8 percent in M2, about the same as the 
projected gain of nominal GNP. A unitary income elasticity of demand for 
M2 is historically consistent with one of about 0.7 for M1. On this basis, 
the  1973-74 increase in M1 would be 5.6 percent. The Economic Report 
provides few clues to interest rates in 1974. But the council's monetary tar- 
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Table  2. Required  Annual  Rates  of Increase  of M1 and  Time  Deposits  to 
Effect  Various  Movements  in Interest  Rates,  1973:4 Actual  and 
Projections  for 1974,  by Quarter 
Percent 
1974  projection,  by quarters 
1973:4 
Interest  rate  and  monetary  variable  Actual  First  Second  Third  Fourth 
Slow decline  in interest  rates 
Rate on commercial  paper  9.0  8.3  8.0  7.7  7.4 
Growth  rate 
Currency  plus demand 
deposits,  M1  3.9  8.5  7.2  5.1  7.2 
Time deposits  5.3  7.4  6.7  5.2  8.2 
Moderate  decline  in interest  rates 
Rate on commercial  paper  9.0  8.2  7.7  7.2  6.7 
Growth  rate 
Ml  3.9  8.6  7.5  5.5  7.8 
Time deposits  5.3  7.6  7.4  6.4  9.8 
Substantial  decline  in interest  rates 
Rateoncommercialpaper  9.0  8.1  7.4  6.7  6.0 
Growth  rate 
M1  3.9  8.7  7.8  5.9  8.4 
Time deposits  5.3  8.1  8.2  7.7  11.6 
Sources: Based on Stephen M.  Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money  Revisited," Brookings Papers on 
Economic  Activity (3:1973), pp. 577-638; and Perry, "Economic Outlook for 1974." 
get and its judicious  balancing  of factors  raising  and lowering  rates  both 
suggest  that  no significant  changes  are  expected  or desired.  If interest  rates 
remain  stable  or rise during  the current  (growth)  recession  and recovery, 
this will be a unique  episode  in business  cycle annals. 
Stephen  Goldfeld  recently  reported  some  carefully  estimated  economet- 
ric equations  of demand  for money.'  Table  2 shows  rates  of increase  of M1 
needed,  according  to his preferred  equation,  for three  alternative  paths  of 
interest  rates in 1974. In each case Perry's  forecasts  for real GNP and 
prices  from  Table  1 were  used.  These  estimates  take  off from 1973:4,  when 
demand  for money  was unusually  high, in the sense  that there  was a large 
positive residual  from the systematic  part of Goldfeld's  equation.2  The 
1. Stephen  M. Goldfeld,  "The Demand for Money Revisited,"  Brookings  Papers  on 
Economic  Activity  (3:1973), pp. 577-638. Hereafter,  this document  will be referred  to 
as BPEA, followed by the date. 
2. I am grateful  to Professor  Goldfeld for these estimates,  which are based on the 
specification  in equation  (4), ibid., p. 582. 222  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
1974  projections  carry  this  residual  with  gradually  diminishing  weight.  The 
residual  for 1973:4,  reflecting  a shift of asset preferences  toward  money, 
is scarcely  surprising.  The  same  uncertainty  and  failure  of confidence  have 
been  painfully  evident  in the stock market. 
Goldfeld  also has an equation  for the time deposits  component  of M2, 
but  it is not as successful  over  the sample  period  as his M1  equation.  Using 
this equation,  I calculated  annual  rates  of increase  in demand  for time de- 
posits  for the four quarters  of 1974,  for the same  three  hypothetical  paths 
of interest  rates.  These  are also shown  in Table  2. 
I conclude  that the standard  forecast-the administration  target-will 
not be met without  rates of monetary  growth  that will  (a) exceed  the rec- 
ommendation  of the council,  and (b) draw  screams  from  monetarists. 
I am very  skeptical  that the standard  GNP scenario  can be staged  with- 
out declines  in interest  rates  at least as sharp  as those shown  in the third 
panel  of Table  2. My skepticism  has three  sources. 
First, one act of the play is a revival  of residential  construction  in the 
second  half  of the  year.  Indeed,  February  figures  suggest  that  the  worst  may 
already  be over.  But  the  current  interest  rate  structure  does  not induce  large 
flows of savings  into thrift  institutions.  Such  flows  will  not occur,  the rec- 
ord suggests,  until open market  rates dip below 7 percent.  Meanwhile, 
during  the current  slump,  mortgage  rates  have  continued  a steady  rise  that 
has scarcely  been  interrupted  since  mid-1971.  Although  nonmonetary  mea- 
sures-advances from the Federal  Home Loan Banks and purchases  by 
the Federal  and Government  National  Mortgage  Associations-are billed 
as remedies  to ease the mortgage  market,  they  have  not yet lowered  rates. 
Tight credit conditions  continue  in a housing market  weakened  by the 
energy  crisis. Prospective  home buyers  are doubtful  about suburban  or 
exurban  locations  and uncertain  about  house size and design. 
Second,  consumer  demand  looks weaker  than the standard  forecast  as- 
sumes. Perry's  forecast  puts personal  saving  rates in 1974  below the 7.3 
percent  of 1973:4-at 6.5, 6.0, 6.1, and 6.4 percent  in successive  quarters. 
The  most  recent  University  of Michigan  survey  of consumer  attitudes  is the 
most pessimistic  ever, by far. Independently  of  this informationa,  Tom 
Juster  has tried  to estimate  the influence  of expectations  and uncertainties 
about inflation,  jobs, and incomes  on the personal  saving  rate.3  For 1974 
3. F. Thomas Juster, "Savings  Behavior,  Uncertainty  and Price Expectations,"  in 
The  Economic  Outlook  for 1974,  Papers  presented  to the Twenty-first  Conference  on the 
Economic Outlook, 1973 (University  of Michigan, Research Seminar  in Quantitative 
Economics, 1974),  pp. 49-70. James Tobin  223 
his equations predict rates in excess of 8 percent of disposable income. A 
third factor lowering the propensity to consume is the transfer of income to 
sellers of food and fuel at home, as well as abroad. A fourth is the decline 
in auto sales because of the gasoline scare. Given the heavy use of install- 
ment finance in auto purchases,  most of the money that would normally be 
spent for cars will be saved rather than spent on other goods. 
Finally, optimism about the prospects for recovery later this year de- 
pends principally on the strength of nonresidential investment in 1974, as 
registered  in surveys of anticipations. The survey reported in March by the 
Commerce Department indicates that business anticipates spending 13 per- 
cent more for investment in plant and equipment in  1974 than was spent 
in  1973. Yet there is an underlying weakness in the financial climate for 
corporate investment, the high cost of capital relative to expected earnings. 
If this is not corrected, it may retard investment later in 1974 or in 1975. In 
the plans for this year, three types of investment play an unusually large 
part: increases in energy-producing capacity; capacity additions in ma- 
terials and other bottleneck sectors; and defensive investments to  adapt 
to new scarcities and higher costs. These kinds of investment are probably 
relatively insensitive to interest rates and capital costs, but a sustained and 
broadly based investment boom  will  depend upon  an improvement in 
expected earnings  relative to costs of finance. I turn to this topic in the next 
section. 
Is the Real Rate  of Interest  Really  Low? 
Figure 1 shows the quarterly  time series of Q, the ratio of the valuation 
of corporate physical capital in the stock and bond markets to its estimated 
cost of reproduction at current prices of goods. The ratio is now below 1, 
for the first time since 1970:3 and only the third time since 1958. A high 
value of  Q is favorable to investment, since a corporation can sell paper 
claims to physical capital for more than the capital costs. A low value of 
Q, on the other hand, means that the rate of return required in the market 
by current and potential share- and bondholders is high relative to the 
marginal productivity of capital. As Keynes has said, 
[The]  daily  revaluations  of the Stock  Exchange,  though  they are primarily  made 
to facilitate  transfers  of old investments  between  one individual  and another,  in- 
evitably  exert  a decisive  influence  on the  rate  of current  investment.  For there  is no 
sense  in building  up a new  enterprise  at a cost greater  than  that at which  a similar 
existing  enterprise  can be purchased;  whilst  there  is an inducement  to spend  on a t  > 
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new project  what may seem an extravagant  sum, if it can be floated off on the 
Stock  Exchange  at an immediate  profit.4 
Figure 2 shows I/K_1,  gross investment as a percentage of the lagged cap- 
ital stock (both in 1958 dollars), over the same time period.5 John Ciccolo 
has also computed a regression of I/K.1  on K&i and eight lagged values of 
Q. From this regression can be calculated projections of 1974 nonresiden- 
tial  fixed investment, in  1958 dollars, assuming that  Q  remains at  its 
1973:4 value of 0.995. 
As I stated above, I have no doubt that special factors will be favorable 
for investment in 1974, and, of course, it is possible that the stock market 
will pick up. Table 3 is meant to show that in the absence of special factors 
or a stock market recovery, investment demand might be weak. 
Table  3. Alternative  Forecasts  of Nonresidential  Fixed  Investment, 
1974,  by Quarter 
Perry  forecast 
"Q"  forecast 
(billions  of  Billions  of  Billions  of 
Year  and  quarter  1958 dollars)  current  dollars  1958 dollarsa 
Actual 
1973:4  94.5  141.8  94.5 
Projection 
1974:1  93.7  145.8  96.0 
2  92.6  147.0  95.6 
3  91.7  153.5  98.6 
4  91.4  158.0  100.2 
Sources: The "Q" forecast (explained in the text) was calculated by John Ciccolo. Other data are from 
Perry, "Economic Outlook for 1974." 
a. Assumes investment deflator rises at 5 percent per year. 
Further evidence is provided by William Nordhaus' calculations, in his 
article in this issue, of the internal after-tax rate of return on corporate 
capital. This rate reached its post-1950 high of  10.0 percent in 1965 and 
fell to  5.4 percent in  1973. Standardized cyclically to  an average unem- 
ployment rate of 4.5 percent, the rate was  10.0 percent in  1965 and 5.6 
percent in 1973. The profit squeeze is not a myth. In these circumstances, 
real rates of interest as high as those that prevailed in the 1960s are not an 
appropriate  target for the Federal Reserve. 
4. John Maynard  Keynes, The General  Theory  of Employment,  Interest  and Money 
(Macmillan,  1973 ed.), p. 151. 
5. I am indebted  to a former  student,  John Ciccolo, now of the New York Federal 
Reserve  Bank, for the calculations  of Q and I/IK1. ON 
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In my opinion,  it is a fallacy  to conclude  that real rates  of interest  are 
low simply  because  current  rates  of inflation  are  high  compared  with  nomi- 
nal market interest  rates on dollar-denominated  assets. The important 
thing,  as I have  argued  above,  is the comparison  of earnings  prospects  and 
interest  rates. This is the comparison  the stock market  makes, and it is 
hard to argue  that real rates  have declined  in any meaningful  sense after 
price-earnings  ratios  have declined  by a third  over  the year. 
The rates of increase  of price  indexes  do not represent  operational  in- 
vestment  opportunities;  it is not possible  to acquire  and hold for future 
sale the consumer  price  index's  market  basket  or a share  of gross  national 
product.  Anyway,  recent  increases  in price indexes  have large one-shot 
components;  rational  savers  and investors  would not extrapolate  those 
rates into the future.  Inflation  premiums  are not immaculately  added  to 
interest  rates.  They are put there  by market  forces and monetary  policy. 
Inflationary  expectations  do not force bond rates up unless  they induce 
borrowers  to float  bonds  and  investors  to shift  into other  assets.  One  would 
expect  equities  to rise  in value.  When  inflationary  news  makes  both bonds 
and  stocks  fall  in price,  the explanation,  I think,  is that  these  markets  know 
that the Federal  Open  Market  Committee  reads  the papers  too and will 
react  by making  policy  more  restrictive. 
I have  lately  been  reading  how money  markets  react  adversely  to news  of 
high rates  of growth  of the stock of money.  Perhaps  the market  is full of 
convinced  monetarists.  More  likely,  the market,  knowing  that the Fed sets 
targets  and  limits  for growth  in the money  stock and is sensitive  to mone- 
tarist  criticism,  anticipates  that the FOMC  will act restrictively  to reverse 
"excessive"  growth  of monetary  aggregates.  This game  is an unfortunate 
consequence  of the Fed's adoption of money-stock  criteria  in making 
policy and of the market's  use of these criteria  in interpreting  policy.  But 
it does not mean that the Fed is impotent  to reduce  interest  rates if it 
really aims to do so. Expectational  markups  of interest  rates  will not be 
sustained  unless  real  live borrowers  appear  to take all the funds  available, 
and this will not happen  unless  the Fed confirms  the expectations  by con- 
tracting  bank  reserves  and supplies  of loanable  funds. 
The Recommendations  of the "Shadow  Open  Market  Committee" 
Tlhe  press  recently  reported  that  the "Shadow  Open  Market  Committee" 
advises  the Fed to set the growth  of M1 at a constant  rate  of 5 to 51/2  per- 228  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1974 
cent per year.6 Just as Milton Friedman did in his letter of February 20, 
1974, to  Senator William Proxmire, the shadow committee blamed the 
Fed for the major part of current inflation. Friedman likewise urged the 
Fed to slow down monetary growth. Advocates of this position rarely tell 
the public the costs of the policy they espouse. Friedman does say ". . . 
there  is literally  no way to end inflation  that will not involve  a temporary, 
though  perhaps  fairly  protracted,  period  of low economic  growth  and  rela- 
tively  high  unemployment."7 
In one sense  the Fed can be held  responsible  for all inflation  that occurs. 
If the Fed were  willing  to starve  the economy  for liquidity,  regardless  of 
the consequences  for real output and employment,  presumably  price in- 
dexes could be held down even when unit labor costs are rising or even 
when special  factors  raise the prices of internationally  traded  goods like 
oil and grain.  But the Fed is not responsible  for the structural  features  of 
modern  industrial  economies  that give them an inflationary  bias even at 
reasonable  rates  of utilization.  Nor can the Fed be blamed  for unwilling- 
ness to accept  the "temporary,  though  perhaps  fairly  protracted"  costs of 
trying  to cure  structural  inflationary  bias  by deflation  of aggregate  demand. 
We already  know  that these  temporary  costs can be fairly  protracted.  In 
1970  Andersen  and Carlson  simulated  their  St. Louis  monetarist  model  for 
steady  rates of monetary  growth  in the period 1970-80.8  With 6 percent 
monetary  growth,  unemployment  stayed  above 5 percent  until 1976 and 
above its natural  rate of 4 percent  until 1978.  With 4 percent  monetary 
growth,  consistent  with  long-run  price  stability,  unemployment  was above 
6 percent  in 1971-75  and  above  5 percent  until  1978,  and  it had  not reached 
4 percent  by 1980. 
In a monetarist  spirit  I have  made  some  similar  calculations  for  the  pres- 
ent context.  I assume  that the shadow  committee's  proposal  for M1  means 
an 8 percent  annual  rate of growth  of nominal  GNP. I also assume  that 
the normal  rate  of growth  of potential  output  is 4 percent  per  year  and,  for 
the sake of argument,  that the natural  rate of unemployment  is 5 percent. 
6. The Shadow  Open Market  Committee  is a private  group of economists  who meet 
occasionally  to recommend  monetary  policies to the Federal  Reserve. 
7. "Letter  on Monetary  Policy," Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. Louis  Review,  Vol. 56 
(March  1974),  p. 23. 
8. Leonall C. Andersen  and Keith M. Carlson, "An Econometric  Analysis of the 
Relation  of Monetary  Variables  to the Behavior  of Prices  and Unemployment,"  in The 
Econometrics  of Price Determination,  Conference  Sponsored  by Board of Governors  of 
the Federal  Reserve System and Social Science Research  Council, 1970 (FRB, 1972), 
pp. 177-81. James  Tobin  229 
The rate of increase  of the GNP deflator  each quarter  is the sum of two 
components.  One is a weighted  average  of the eight preceding  quarterly 
increases,  the  weights  summing  to one. The other  is a correction  depending 
on U 1, the unemployment  rate  for the previous  quarter:  the correction  is 
positive  if U 1 is less than 5 percent;  negative  if it exceeds  5 percent. 
The specific form of the second component is (b/U_)  -  (b/5).  I have 
used  two vastly  different  values  for b. The first  is 13.32,  which  comes  from 
the Phillips  curve  of the old Fed-MIT-Penn  model  as reported  by de Menil 
and  Enzler  in 1970.9  This  is an optimistic  view  of the  efficacy  of unemploy- 
ment  in slowing  down inflation,  for it implies  that the difference  between 
6 percent  and 5 percent  unemployment  is a reduction  of 0.4 percentage 
point  each  quarter  in the annual  percentage  rate  of inflation.  This  is surely 
overoptimistic  for the purpose,  since  the de Menil-Enzler  Phillips  curve  has 
no natural  rate and attributes  variations  in wage inflation  predominantly 
to variations  of unemployment.  The second value of b is 4.0, from an 
Eckstein-Brinner  wage  equation  (reestimated  by Gordon),10  in which full 
feedback  of past price  changes  accounts  for the lion's share  of explained 
variance  of wage  inflation.  On this basis, unemployment  of 6 percent  cuts 
down the annual rate of inflation  only by 0.13 percentage  point each 
quarter. 
The simulations,  displayed  in Figure  3, assume  that the Perry  forecasts 
are  realized  in 1974  and  that  the monetarist  recommendation  takes  hold in 
1975:  1. From  then  on, nominal  GNP grows  at an annual  rate  of 8 percent. 
In the optimistic  version,  unemployment  rises  to 6.9 percent  in 1978:  2 and 
finally  gets down  to 5 percent  in 1982:4.  In 1978:2  the rate of price  infla- 
tion crosses  its long-run  equilibrium  value of 4 percent.  That is why un- 
employment  begins  to decline.  But by 1982:4  the rate of price  inflation  is 
only 2 percent,  so unemployment  overshoots  and continues  to decline. 
Eventually  the rate  of inflation  accelerates  again,  and so on. I stopped  the 
cycle at the end of 1985,  assuming  that the Shadow  Open  Market  Com- 
mittee  might  have  had another  meeting  by that time. 
The second  version  is even worse,  as might  be expected  in view of the 
weak  effect  of high  unemployment  on wage  inflation.  Unemployment  rises 
steadily  for eight  years. 
9. George de Menil and Jared  J. Enzler, "Prices  and Wages in the FR-MIT-Penn 
Econometric  Model,"  in ibid., pp. 277-308. 
10. Robert J. Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve," 
BPEA (2:1972), pp. 385-421. C)~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 
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The  Old  Dilemma  Once  More 
The  recommendations  of the  shadow  committee  and  of  Friedman  raise 
once  again  the  big  and  terribly  uncomfortable  issues  of  macroeconomic 
policy.  So,  for  that  matter,  does  the  CEA  at  the  beginning  of  its  1974 
Report: 
...  while continued  rapid  inflation  is not inevitable,  the course  of unwinding  it 
will be long and difficult  ...  to hope that we can "wring  the inflation  out of the 
system"  by the end of some short  period  is to assure  disappointment.  Whoever 
undertakes  now to fight  inflation  must be prepared  to stay the long course.  We 
think  it is necessary  to do this, and also to recognize  why we must do it. Experi- 
ence extending  over almost  a decade  teaches  us that if we do not fight  inflation 
effectively  it will accelerate.... 
[The  facts  of our  prosperity  over  the  past eight years] do not relieve  us of the 
need to bring  inflation  under  control,  and to accept  the cost of doing so for the 
sake of avoiding  the greater  costs of an accelerating  inflation." 
This  statement  makes  me  wonder  what  macroeconomic  scenario  the 
administration  has  in mind  for  1975 and  subsequent  years. 
In  the  fight  against  inflation,  the  urgent  matter  in  1974  is  to  keep  the 
fuel-food  bulge  in prices  from  escalating  the  rate  of  wage  inflation.  From 
the  record  so  far,  one  can  be  moderately  hopeful,  and  there  are  reasons 
why  one  would  not  expect  rising  commodity  prices  to  pull  wages  all  the 
way  up  after  them.  These  price  increases  do  not  improve  the  bargaining 
power  of most  employees.  They  do  not  inflate  the  profits  of  employers  or 
the value  of labor  to them;  in many  instances  the  opposite  is true. They  do 
not  distort  the  pattern  of  relative  wages  and  provoke  another  round  of 
wage-wage  spiral.  Still,  with  George  Meany  talking  12  percent,  no  one 
would  underrate  the problem. 
But I doubt  that the wage  outcome  this year will  depend  appreciably  on 
whether  the unemployment  rate is 6 percent  or 5.5 percent  or 5 percent.  As 
I have  already  noted,  wage  equations  that  assign  high  coefficients  to  past 
price  experience  do  not  assign  a strong  influence  to  unemployment.  The 
short-run  Phillips  curve  is flat  at high  rates  of  unemployment.  Since  it is 
steep  at low  rates,  a much  longer  time  is required  to  unwind  an  inflation 
than  to  generate  one. 
In  the  circumstances,  neither  monetary  policy  nor  aggregate-demand 
11. Economic  Report,  February  1974, p. 21. 232  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1974 
policy  in general  is a useful  tool. As Arthur  Okun  has observed,  if there 
really  is a danger  that a one-shot  bulge  in particular  prices  will be perma- 
nently  incorporated  in general  wage  and price  inflation,  and if the damage 
of such  acceleration  is as great  as the CEA suggests,  then all kinds  of pre- 
ventive measures-controls, subsidies,  rollbacks-would be justified,  in 
spite  of their  temporary  allocational  costs. 
Should  not a real  effort  to negotiate  a social  treaty  with George  Meany 
and other labor representatives  be the first order of business?  I suspect 
that American  consumers,  wage earners,  union leaders,  and businessmen 
are  quite  capable  of understanding  that scarcities  of food and fuel make it 
impossible  for their  real  incomes  to grow  at the accustomed  pace.  Workers 
might  accept  wage  guideposts  for 1974  and 1975  that recognize  this fact of 
life. But they would have to regain  confidence  that the sacrifices  will be 
equitably  shared.  Indeed,  wage guideposts  might be more acceptable  if 
workers  were  assured  that the burdens  of layoffs  and short  time were  not 
piled  on top of the inescapable  burdens  of commodity  scarcities. 
The abiding  problem  will be with us whatever  happens  in 1974. My 
views  and  values  respecting  unemployment  and  inflation  are  not shared  by 
all economists.  I do not agree  that inflation,  or even acceleration  of infla- 
tion, is ipso  facto evidence  of excess  aggregate  demand.  I do not agree  that 
all unemployment  up to the "natural"  rate  compatible  with  zero or steady 
inflation  is ipso  facto voluntary.  Anyone  who does agree  to those proposi- 
tions would have no qualms  in aiming  monetary  and fiscal  policy at the 
single  target  of zero inflation. 
For the rest of us, the tormenting  difficulty  is that the economy  shows 
inflationary  bias even  when  there  is significant  involuntary  unemployment. 
The bias is in some sense a structural  defect  of the economy  and society, 
perhaps  a failure  to find and to respect  orderly  political  and social mech- 
anisms  for reconciling  inconsistent  claims to real income. Chronic  and 
accelerating  inflation  is then a symptom  of a deeper  social disorder,  of 
which involuntary  unemployment  is an alternative  symptom. Political 
economists  may  differ  about  whether  it is better  to face the social  conflicts 
squarely  or to let inflation  obscure  them  and  muddle  through.  I can under- 
stand  why anyone  who prefers  the first  alternative  would be working  for 
structural  reform,  for a new social contract.  I cannot understand  why he 
would  believe  that the  job can be done by monetary  policy.  Within  limits, 
the Federal  Reserve  can shift  from one symptom  to the other.  But it can- 
not cure  the disease. 